AS THE bombers go in, for the first time in the long evolution of the Balkan crisis, the outside powers are directly confronting the author of that crisis. Always before, the Serbian leader has distanced himself from the tragic situations which he has played such a large part in creating. Notoriously, he has presented himself as the man who can arrange a solution, and it has been a strategy that has worked, again and again. But this unnatural partnership came to an end at Rambouillet, when it became clear that Slobodan Milosevic would not hand Kosovo over to Western protectors, in spite of both serious threats and serious inducements. The Western countries, on their side, could not accept that Milosevic should keep Kosovo, given that his only way to do so is by violent methods. Now, with the bombing, the break is, or should be, total.
Milosevic╒s fall from power cannot be a formal aim of the Nato operation, which must properly confine itself to the attempt to limit suffering in Kosovo. Yet it is also true that if the objective of limiting that suffering is to be attained, then the broad aim must be a general settlement in former Yugoslavia, and such a settlement is hard now to envisage if Milosevic is still in power. The story that began in Kosovo 10 years ago, when Slobodan Milosevic began his career as a master manipulator of ethnic and national feeling in the former Yugoslavia, must be brought to an end.
The risks that Kosovars may face because of the bombing are described elsewhere in the paper by a Kosovar journalist. The picture he paints, of a population fleeing danger in the countryside only to meet equal, or worse, danger in the towns, is a dismal one. While it is true that the Kosovo Albanians were already under attack before Nato took its decision to bomb, it is obviously possible that Nato strikes could make it immediately worse for them than it would otherwise have been. But the balance of risk depends crucially on our estimate of the Serbia over which Milosevic presides. Is it a society likely to fight ferociously and effectively for Kosovo? The indications are that Serbia, while lacking any real sense of self-criticism and feeling it is unfair that it is the butt of everybody╒s anger, is not in the sort of shape that would enable it to fight a hard war.
Young conscripts do not wish to go to Kosovo, and, when sent, desert in considerable numbers. Many regular officers are doubtful both about Milosevic╒s policies and about their capacity to carry them out. The most prominent of such officers, General Momcilo Perisic, was sacked by Milosevic last year precisely because he maintained that it was not the job of the armed forces to oppress the population. The special interior ministry troops, who are not part of the army, are better paid and enjoy perquisites such as looting.
But the morale of Serb forces in Kosovo depends on their military edge over the Kosovo Liberation Army and the helpless nature of the population at large. Once they have to face punishing attack from the air, that morale may suffer enormously. It is worth remembering that the capacity of the Bosnian Serb forces, who included regular elements from Serbia, was vastly over-estimated by many Western military analysts. They warned the Croats that an attack on Krajina would be bloodily repulsed. In the event the Croats beat the Bosnian Serb forces in three days and took virtually no casualties. Certainly Kosovo is not Bosnia, the forces there are stronger, and it would be foolish to count on a swift collapse. Equally, it is permissible to hope that the Serb forces will turn out to be less formidable in reality than they look on paper.
Even if that is the case, we ought still to be making preparations now, discreet but serious, for the use of ground troops. Their entry into Kosovo, too, might not be such a dangerous business as the pessimists contend. Throughout the Yugoslav wars of succession, it has been a persistent Western mistake to overestimate Serbian strength and to argue that Milosevic was a man with whom we had to do business. While accepting that Nato is taking serious risks, we ought also to bear in mind that Milosevic is a man whose time has passed and that Serbia is a weak society, in large part because of his foolish and criminal leadership.
